“Seven-Party Conclave in Brussels: Democratic Legality, Political Fracture”
Seven-Party Conclave in Brussels, TFA Sidelined: Institutional Legality, Democratic Fracture
By Kadir Duran | Bruxelles Korner
TFA sidelined after 600 days of deadlock
After more than 600 days of deadlock, the announcement of a seven-party conclave to form a Brussels regional government is meant as an institutional shock therapy. Initiated by Georges-Louis Bouchez, the table brings together MR, PS, Les Engagés on the francophone side, and Groen, Vooruit, CD&V, Anders on the Dutch-speaking side.
One major absence stands out: Team Fouad Ahidar (TFA)—yet the second-largest Dutch-speaking force to emerge from the ballot box.
This is not a marginal detail. It goes to the core of Brussels democracy: can a government be formed—legally—without representing a significant electoral current? And above all, at what political cost?
The Numbers That Matter
The Brussels Parliament has 89 seats:
- 72 francophone seats (majority: 37)
- 17 Dutch-speaking seats (majority: 9)
TFA secured 3 of the 17 Dutch-speaking seats, positioning itself as a potential pivot actor. Excluding it from the conclave means assuming a majority can be built without reflecting that electoral dynamic.
Seven-Party Conclave: Accelerator—or Staged Landing?
Bouchez’s initiative to convene MR, PS, Les Engagés, Groen, Vooruit, CD&V and Anders comes after prolonged paralysis and mounting institutional fatigue. The key question is not whether the move is spectacular, but whether it is sequentially coherent.
Here, the CRISP expression “putting the cart before the horse” is apt. A conclave works best when parameters are already locked—a clearly identifiable majority and an agreement architecture largely mapped out—serving to force the final stretch.
Why “the Cart Before the Horse” Is More Than a Catchphrase
A conclave does not invent a coalition; it finalizes one. Yet several fundamentals remain unresolved:
- a majority question (not merely a policy text),
- a community balance question (a fully legitimate Dutch-speaking majority),
- budgetary sustainability, and
- public order and security (stations, surrounding areas) as a credibility test.
In short: if there is no runway, you can lock the pilots in the cockpit—the airport will not appear.
The Unspoken Risk: N-VA’s Absence
From the N-VA camp, the critique is already structured: “the PS decides who sits at the table,” risking an executive without reforms—seen as a Vivaldi-style continuity.
Two concrete implications follow:
- Dutch-speaking legitimacy: even if the numbers add up, the argument that “the Flemish choice was bypassed” can become a time bomb on every sensitive dossier.
- Budgetary narrative: if the deal looks like a patchwork to manage crisis without governance shock, the promise of “balance by 2029” risks becoming messaging rather than mechanism.
And TFA Sidelined?
Procedural Democracy vs. Representative Democracy
Legally, there is no obligation to invite every party to negotiations. Procedural democracy is assessed at the final vote: a majority coalition, adopted texts—case closed.
Politically, however, excluding TFA is problematic. It fuels a familiar Brussels sentiment: “we count at the ballot box, less in the kitchen.” Over time, this weakens the social legitimacy of the executive in a region already marked by community, social, and identity fault lines.
A Governability Cordon—Not an Ideological One
Labeling this move as a “right-wing drift to the extreme” would be simplistic. What is emerging is a cordon of governability: avoiding topics deemed inflammable (state neutrality, symbolic conviction issues) as long as an arithmetically viable majority can bypass TFA.
The choice is strategic, not ideological. Its cost is clear: turning an emerging actor into a force of resentment rather than an integrated—if demanding—partner.
The Conclave Paradox
A conclave is a landing method, not an engine for take-off. Historically, it serves to lock in an already-outlined deal, not to invent a coalition. Here, the majority remains politically fragile and narratively contestable.
The broader the table (seven parties), the more the agreement gravitates toward the lowest common denominator: general principles, promises of balance by 2029, consensual security priorities. Useful to exit paralysis; insufficient to rebuild governance.
Conclusion
Yes, it is democratic in the strict institutional sense.
No, it is not healthy for representative democracy in Brussels.
Core risk: governing without integrating a genuine electoral breakthrough means accepting a legitimacy under tension, ready to crack at the first budgetary or security shock.
In Brussels, one can form a government against a trend. But durable governance is built with society. And that is precisely what remains unresolved.
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